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TROLLS OR GREAT INVENTORS:
CASE STUDIES OF PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES

RYAN T. HOLTE*
ABSTRACT
There has been much debate about the economic harms caused by patent
infringement lawsuits filed by patent holders who do not make or sell products
covered by their own patents—entities pejoratively referred to as “patent
trolls.” This debate has thus far been largely theoretical or based on broad
industry-wide data. The purpose of this Article is to present a focused
empirical report that has previously been lacking—detailed information
regarding the inventors themselves, the patent assertion entities (PAEs) that
represent them, and the stories behind their patents. The research for this
Article centers on two instructive case studies: (1) MercExchange, L.L.C., the
prominent PAE whose seminal patent infringement action against eBay
continued to the Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388 (2006); and (2) Capital Security Systems, Inc., a lesser-known PAE
that has sued some of the largest banks in the world on its patented electronic
check processing technology. This Article explores the stories behind the
inventors, the patented inventions, and the entities asserting the patents in
order to develop a more complete contextualized picture of PAEs and their
economic impact. Based on this more complete picture, the Article then
assesses whether these patent holders warrant the “patent troll” moniker,
lurking under the bridge of innovation waiting to harass and extort innovators
attempting to pass, or whether they instead resemble the great American vision
of a Horatio Alger novel protagonist, laboring to build that bridge of
innovation brick-by-brick and eventually reaping a reward for their hard effort.
The Article concludes that, while additional studies are needed, the two PAEs
studied herein fall squarely into the latter honest laborer category.
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INTRODUCTION
Much ado has recently been made of patent infringement lawsuits filed by
patent holders who do not practice the patents they own. These non-practicing
patent holders are often referred to as “non-practicing entities” (NPEs), “patent
assertion entities” (PAEs), or, more pejoratively, “patent trolls.”1 Regardless of
name, the debate over these patent holders has regrettably been characterized
more by contempt than praise.2 Further, little has been done to contextualize
the debate by examining the particularized facts concerning the patent holders
themselves, the stories behind their inventions, or the entities that represent
their interests.
The purpose of this Article is to provide some of the missing context. The
research detailed here centers on two instructive PAEs, defining “PAEs” as a
person or company who does not manufacture products or supply services
related to patents it has rights to, but instead enforces the patent rights against
accused infringers in an attempt to collect licensing fees.3 First,
MercExchange, L.L.C., a notorious patent infringement PAE whose seminal
action continued through full trial, a Federal Circuit appeal, and a decision by
the United States Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.4
Second, Capital Security Systems, Inc., a lesser-known PAE who has filed
various patent infringement actions regarding electronic check processing
technologies against the largest banks in the world with such actions generally
ending in litigation settlements. These two PAEs were selected for case study
in part because they both had a vast amount of records for independent review
in building their history and because of the contrast between their respective
litigation processes—MercExchange’s litigation against a limited number of
defendants through trial and multiple appeals versus Capital Security Systems’
many lawsuits which generally result in quick settlement. The case studies
extract the factual history of the inventor, invention, and entity creation that
resulted in the patent assertions. Once those facts are drawn, analysis is made

1. To walk a middle line regarding terminology, this Article uses the descriptive term
“Patent Assertion Entities” (or “PAEs”), as the focus concerns business entities that assert
patents. The definition of PAE is different than the original definition advanced by Colleen
Chien. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300 (2010) (“The most visible
buyers of patents have been ‘patent-assertion entities,’ which I define as entities that use patents
primarily to get licensing fees rather than to support the development or transfer of technology.”).
2. See infra Part I.
3. MercExchange is deemed “instructive” of a PAE, as it was described as having patent
troll qualities by academics during briefing before the U.S. Supreme Court. Capital Security
Systems, Inc. (CSS) is deemed “instructive” of a PAE as it is a company that does not sell any
products and, among other things, is partnered for patent licensing with IPNav. For further
discussion, see infra Part II.B.
4. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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to compare the researched PAE story with the “troll” issues and broad
empirical data that has previously been put forth. Results are scrutinized to
determine if this initial focused case study research supports a PAE story that
is more “patent troll” or historically great American “Horatio Alger Inventor.”5
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I reviews the current debate
regarding PAEs, including current “troll” discussions, empirical research, and
recently proposed patent law changes. Part II explains why case studies are
vital in developing a more complete picture of the role PAEs play in the
overall economy. Part III presents two instructive PAE case studies—
MercExchange and Capital Security Systems—and explores in detail the
factual background behind the patented inventions, the inventors themselves,
the PAEs who enforced the patents against the respective industry leaders, and
the current state of the invention, inventor, and entity. Part IV attempts to
separate fact from fiction, analyzing how well the actual PAE data comports
with the currently popular PAE theories advanced by proponents and
opponents alike. The Article concludes that, while additional case studies are
needed, those presented herein depict PAEs as honest laborers working hard to
build a bridge to innovation, more so than trolls sulking beneath the bridge
impending innovation and harming the economy.
I. REVIEW OF THE CURRENT PAE DEBATE
The debate around PAEs is most certainly the preeminent discussion in
intellectual property law today. The New York Times and other newspapers
have run innumerable articles on the actors,6 National Public Radio has

5. The descriptive term “Horatio Alger Inventor”—defined through a list of characteristics
in Part I.D.—is based on the great American vision held by protagonist characters in novels
written by 19th-century author Horatio Alger, Jr. The Alger subjects are most often characterized
by rags-to-riches narratives, similar to Chris Cotropia’s “individual inventor motif” of a garage
inventor wanting nothing more than to monetize his “Flash of Genius” invention. See Christopher
A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH.
52, 54 (2009) (“The garage inventor is as American as apple pie. We enjoy stories of independent
inventors, working against all odds to provide society with amazing technological breakthroughs.
The stories are so entertaining that popular movies are made about such individuals—such as
Flash of Genius, telling the story of Robert Kerns, the inventor of the intermittent windshield
wiper system.”). See also Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal
Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2268 (1989) (“[Legal] narrative is
truncated, simple and highly formalized. We can see this same phenomenon in the case of an
American cultural narrative like the ‘Horatio Alger story.’ Once an extensive oeuvre of over forty
very specific novels and short stories written by the nineteenth-century author Horatio Alger, the
concept of an ‘Horatio Alger story’ has become a schematized ‘rags to riches’ folk model that is a
cultural template with which to measure a wide variety of social data from conversational stories
to legal concepts . . . .”).
6. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, House Bill Raises Bar for Suits Over Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
6, 2013, at B4; Brad Feld, A Bipartisan Plan to Clean Up the Patent Mess, WALL ST. J (Nov. 14,
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featured multiple stories on the debate,7 and companies, legal scholars, and
economists around the world have written countless “troll” discussion pieces,
and commissioned just as many empirical studies, on the issues involved.8
Regarding changes within government, the debate appears to be at a climax:
the new Chairwoman of the Federal Trade Commission has made PAEs her
top priority;9 President Obama has repeatedly urged Congress to enact new
legislation,10 even mentioning patent reform during his 2014 State of the Union
Address;11 and on December 5, 2013, the House of Representatives passed the
Innovation Act by a vote of 325 to 91 to “take[ ] meaningful steps to address
the abusive practices that have damaged our patent system and resulted in
significant economic harm to our nation.”12 Even state attorneys general have
begun using state consumer protection laws to attack PAEs.13 Beyond

2013, 6:56 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023037638045791844440
20604378.
7. When Patents Attack, NPR (July 22, 2011, 8:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/
2011/07/26/138576167/when-patents-attack; When Patents Attack. . .Part Two!, NPR (June 4,
2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2013/06/ 07/188370495/when-patents-attackpart-two.
8. See infra Part I.A.1.
9. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Computer and
Communications Industry Association and American Antitrust Institute Program: Competition
Law & Patent Assertion Entities: What Antitrust Enforcers Can Do 12 (June 20, 2013) (transcript
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/competition-lawpatent-assertion-entities-what-antitrust-enforcers-can-do/130620paespeech.pdf) (“The
Commission can contribute to a broad policy response to PAEs by using its Section 6(b) authority
to collect more comprehensive information on the variety of PAE business models and the scope
of their activities. Antitrust and consumer protection enforcement, where warranted, can also have
important roles to play in reducing the harm associated with certain PAE conduct. But patent
reform and efforts by both the PTO and the courts, are critical to any effort to move the consumer
welfare dial on PAEs from cost to benefit.”).
10. Edward Wyatt, Obama Orders Regulators to Root Out ‘Patent Trolls,’ N.Y. TIMES, June
5, 2013, at B1 (noting that President Obama announced several executive orders “to protect
innovators from frivolous litigation” by patent trolls); Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to
Protect American Innovation, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www.white
house.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-patent-trolls-protect-american-innovation (President Obama
stated that patent trolls “don’t actually produce anything themselves. They’re just trying to
essentially leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort some money out of
them.”).
11. Diane Bartz, Obama Urges Congress to Pass Anti-Patent Troll Bill, REUTERS (Jan. 28,
2014, 9:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/29/us-usa-obama-patent-idUSBREA0S
07V20140129.
12. Diane Bartz, House Passes Tech Backed Bill to Rein in ‘Patent Trolls,’ REUTERS (Dec.
5, 2013, 3:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/05/us-patents-congress-idUSBRE9B
40Y820131205 (quoting Congressman Robert Goodlatte).
13. Pamela M. Prah, State AGs Target Patent Trolls to Protect Business, USA TODAY (Nov.
25, 2013, 9:29 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/25/state-ag-patent-
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discussion points and studies, however, there is no denying current PAE
litigation has an impact on the economy and invention generally.14
For the purposes of this Article, and its case study analysis focus, this Part
will survey the PAE literature available to extract discussion themes that are
useful for comparison to the factual case studies later presented.15 The current
PAE discussion will be broken into three sections: the “troll” debate, empirical
points, and focused changes in patent laws regarding PAEs. Each of the
sections will focus on discussion regarding the inventions and entities within a
PAE classification, as opposed to a broad multi-party problem that could not
be addressed within an individual-entity case study. This review and
accompanying discussion is not intended to be comprehensive. Like the limited
case study focus, it is merely representative of an initial building block upon
which further research can be tailored.
A.

The Two Sides of the “Troll” Debate
1.

One Side of the “Troll” Debate: PAEs Are a Plague on the Patent
System

Perhaps the best place to begin a review of the “troll” discussion is with
the now commonplace term “patent troll.”16 In early deliberations regarding

trolls/3696889/ (“A handful of attorneys general this year began using state consumer laws to
combat trolling, a strategy pioneered by Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell . . . .”).
14. Ronald Bailey, Patent Trolls or Tech Fairy Godmothers?, REASON.COM (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://reason.com/archives/2012/01/24/patent-trolls-or-tech-fairy-godmothers. See also James
Bessen et al., The Private and Social Cost of Patent Trolls, REGULATION, Winter 2011–12, at 26,
26 (“We find that NPE lawsuits are associated with half a trillion dollars of lost wealth to
defendants from 1990 through 2010. During the last four years, the lost wealth has averaged over
$80 billion per year. These defendants are mostly technology companies that invest heavily in
R&D. . . . That is, these lawsuits substantially reduce their incentives to innovate.”); Robin
Feldman & Thomas Ewing, The Giants Among Us, STAN. TECH. L. REV., Jan. 9, 2012, at 1, 5
n.22, available at https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-lawreview-stlr/online/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf (“The size of Intellectual Ventures’ portfolio can
also be estimated based upon how much the company has spent acquiring this portfolio and how
much they have spent per patent. . . . Intellectual Ventures had spent $1.163 billion acquiring
patents by May, 2009. In a study of Ocean Tomo patent auctions, we concluded that Intellectual
Ventures had spent a little more than $61 million acquiring 410 US patents . . . at an average cost
of $148,966 per US patent obtained.”).
15. See infra Part IV.
16. Of interesting note is that the term “patent troll” was first coined in 2001 by Peter
Detkin, former in-house counsel for Intel Corporation, while describing a set of small companies
suing Intel for patent infringement. Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for
Dollars, THE RECORDER (July 30, 2001), http://www.phonetel.com/pdfs/LWTrolls.pdf. See also
Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2006, at 50, 53. Mr. Detkin’s current position is
founder and vice-chairman of the patent aggregator Intellectual Ventures. See Leadership,
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the term’s definitions, potential descriptors have used it to refer to: “somebody
who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing and
have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced”;17 “an entity
that owns a single patent or a small group of patents and essentially is looking
for nuisance-value settlements”;18 “[a]nybody who tries to enforce a patent in
an area where they are not actively competing with a product or process”;19 or
“anyone who threatens litigation on dubious patents.”20 Through further debate
and research, the scholarship has grown to understand that there are different
types of PAEs in the marketplace.21 However, all descriptors do seem to come
with a negative undertone.
In summarizing the “troll” debates, broad themes do seem to emerge—
PAEs force commercializing companies to pay for patent infringement
damages or to purchase a patent license without adding any value to society
themselves.22 Robert Merges has stated that the “true distinction . . . concerns
the difference between patentees who make real contributions to innovation
and those who do not.”23 In a brief Merges et al. prepared for the U.S. Supreme
Court in the case of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.—the case study
discussed infra—Merges et al. advocated on behalf of amicus curiae Yahoo!
INTELL. VENTURES, http://www.intellectualventures.com/about/leadership (last visited Oct. 9,
2014).
17. Sandburg, supra note 16 (“Detkin spends much of his time these days fighting off claims
of patent infringement by companies that have never made a semiconductor device. In 1999
alone, the claims topped $15 billion, Detkin said, and he hurls the epithet ‘patent trolls’ at the
companies that want Intel to pay up. He even keeps a couple of troll dolls on his desk in the gray
warren of buildings at Intel’s Santa Clara headquarters just as a reminder of his company’s legal
enemies.”).
18. Seidenberg, supra note 16.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the MostLitigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 tbl.1 (2009) (listing a dozen entity status categories
including the following: Entity Class 1 (acquired patents); Entity Class 2 (university heritage or
tie); Entity Class 3 (failed startup); Entity Class 4 (corporate heritage); Entity Class 5 (individualinventor-started company); Entity Class 6 (university/government/NGO); Entity Class 7 (startup,
pre-product); Entity Class 8 (product company); Entity Class 9 (individual); Entity Class 10
(undetermined); Entity Class 11 (industry consortium); and Entity Class 12 (IP subsidiary of
product company)).
22. James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 421 (2014) (“Large numbers of expensive lawsuits by NPEs impose
substantial costs on society regardless of whether the patents involved are valid or not.”).
23. Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law
Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1587, 1599–1600 (2009) (“Many patent assertion
companies do not perform research and development as those terms are commonly understood.
They do not participate in the growth of knowledge and technology. True trolls do not really
innovate at all. . . . And this stark fact explains succinctly why the market for true troll activity is
not worth defending. It is a market for a product that has no social value at all.”).
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Inc. that “entities that have engaged in strategic ‘troll-like’ behavior should not
be entitled to injunctions.”24 Specifically, problems with PAEs were
summarized as:
 “[PAEs] do not innovate, but rather seek to acquire broad and nebulous
25
patent claims that arguably encompass existing technologies . . . .”
 “[PAEs] in the computer and Internet industry . . . . [result in] a ‘patent
thicket’: ‘a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a
company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new
26
technology.’”
 “[PAEs] manipulate [Patent Office] processes to delay patent issuance and
thereby set a ‘trap’ for claimed infringement . . . . [or] delay invoking the
patent, knowing that the value of the infringing use to the infringer will
27
increase during the delay.”

In a more recent article discussing PAE growth, increasing costs of patent
litigation, and seemingly excessive damages awards, Mark Lemley and Doug
Melamed summarize three distinct business models for PAEs: (1) “a company
that owns a patent and hopes to strike it big in court”; (2) those “interested in
quick, low-value settlements for a variety of patents”; and (3) those “engaged
in the business of patent aggregation[,] . . . . collect[ing] many patents—
sometimes tens of thousands[—to] demand royalties to license the portfolio

24. Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange
L.L.C., 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997, 1003 (2006). The argument against MercExchange
receiving an injunction was differentiated from “legitimate companies” as follows: “the Federal
Circuit has carefully interpreted Section 284, which authorizes damages, to ensure that patent
holders receive relief that is proportionate to the contribution of their invention to the overall
economic value of the end product. . . . At the same time, the courts should continue to award
injunctions to legitimate companies producing socially valuable products to continue to
encourage innovation consistent with the underlying principles of patent law.” Id. at 1014–15.
25. Id. at 1004–05 (“The enormous complexity of the computer and Internet sector has,
however, given rise to a ‘new breed of entrepreneurs’ known as ‘patent trolls.’ These entities do
not innovate, but rather seek to acquire broad and nebulous patent claims that arguably
encompass existing technologies relied on by companies with deep pockets. By acquiring these
claims and threatening or pursuing litigation, the patent trolls seek and often receive economic
settlements from genuine innovators and producers that greatly exceed the true economic value of
the patents in question.”).
26. Id. at 1005 (quoting Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard-Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120–21 (Adam
Jaffee et al. eds., 2001)). The authors continue: “To compound the problem, no computer or
Internet company can be confident that its product will not ultimately be found by a court to
infringe existing patents, even if it engages in an extensive patent search that may substantially
delay release of a product and cost millions of dollars.” Id. at 1107.
27. Id. at 1002.
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and threaten to sue those that do not pay.”28 Lemley and Melamed agree with
others that “there is little evidence that [PAEs] significantly increase rewards
to inventors”29 and find support for similar theories as those advanced by
Merges et al.:
 PAEs result in “‘royalty stacking’—the cumulative burden of the royalty
obligations resulting from the large number of patents on technologies used
30
in IT products.”
 PAEs “aggregate too many patents.”

31

 Litigating against PAEs “is more costly than dealing with practicing entities
32
. . . . [PAEs] are more willing to prolong and broaden patent litigation.”
 PAEs are more inclined “to defer licensing discussions until technology
users have developed and invested in products that include the patented
33
technologies and are thus less able to switch to alternatives.”

While Lemley and Melamed conclude that patent assertions by practicing
entities create problems just as costly as those created by PAEs, the recent
review of problems commonly associated with PAEs provides a partial
necessary starting point for the analysis here.

28. Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 2117, 2126–27 (2013). It is important to note that this Article concludes that many of the
complaints regarding PAEs as the source of problems with the patent system have little
substance.
29. Id. at 2125, 2129 (“[T]rolls engage more frequently than practicing entities in conduct
that increases the costs of technology users while providing little if any countervailing benefit.”).
For a counter argument to Lemley and Melamed’s conclusions and a discussion of the benefits
patent mass aggregators may provide, see David L. Schwartz, On Mass Patent Aggregators, 114
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 51 (2014), available at http://www.columbialawreview.org/On-masspatent-aggregators_Schwartz.
30. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 28, at 2148.
31. Id. at 2153. While Lemley and Melamed do support a conclusion that PAEs aggregate
too many patents, to the extent that PAEs aggregate large numbers of patents, they conclude that
the aggregation likely reduces the costs to technology users. Id. at 2167 (“The advent of trolls has
probably led to the monetization of patents that would otherwise have been ignored, but it is not
clear that that is a bad thing as a matter of public policy or that the broadening of the secondary
market for patents that trolls have stimulated will remain unique to trolls in the future.”).
32. Id. at 2161–62. Regarding litigation, Lemley and Melamed also conclude that litigation
is generally much less costly for PAEs than practicing entities “because [PAEs] have less
complex business operations—and thus fewer witnesses and far fewer documents—to produce in
discovery.” Id. at 2162. But see id. at 2176 (“[H]igh costs and uncertainty of litigation encourages
bottom-feeder suits aimed at [quick] settlement rather than at winning.”).
33. Id. at 2165.
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The Other Side of the “Troll” Debate: PAEs Can Be a Positive Part of
the Patent System

While the overwhelming amount of PAE literature is negative, a few
commentators have noted positive attributes. In his recent book The Falcon’s
Gyre: Legal Foundations of Economic Innovation and Growth, professor of
law and economics, Robert Cooter, explains:
Innovating, marketing, and enforcing are different specialties . . . . By
prosecuting infringers who use an invention to produce consumer goods,
[PAEs] transfer resources from consuming to innovating, which speeds
progress in the useful arts. To increase progress in the useful arts, law should
facilitate sales of patent rights to [PAEs] for innovations used in consumption
34
or production.

In short, Cooter finds the specialty that PAEs provide in transferring resources
from consuming/consumers to innovating/inventors a necessary value in the
patent system—different people and firms have comparative advantage in
different activities.35
Following on Cooter’s analysis, Michael Risch argues that PAEs may play
a key middleman role in the patent system by purchasing patents from nonemployed, non-practicing individual inventors and supporting the “ethos” of
the individual inventor.36 This “ethos” has been described by Christopher
Cotropia “as American as apple pie.”37 Risch goes on to argue that PAEs
accumulating patents into portfolios treated like securities would (1) subject
them to new regulatory framework to improve market integrity, and (2)
“encourage the formation of transparent market clearinghouses and
development of methods for determining pricing.”38
While discussing the intent of the 1952 Patent Act and historically
reviewing patent entities, Scott Kieff, former professor and current
commissioner of the International Trade Commission, raises another useful
point applicable to current PAEs: patents, and the ability to own and assert

34. ROBERT COOTER WITH AARON EDLIN, THE FALCON’S GYRE: LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC INNOVATION AND GROWTH 6.23–6.24 (1.4 ed. 2014).
35. Id. See also Timothy Holbrook, Not All Patent Trolls Are Demons, CNN.COM (Feb. 21,
2014, 9:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/21/opinion/holbrook-patent-trolls-demons (“What
is lost in this mudslinging is that much of what PAEs do is laudable—paying inventors. Patents
don’t grow on trees. Someone came up with the invention and incurred considerable expense to
obtain the patent. Many inventors can’t bring their invention to market themselves, however, so
selling the patent may be the only way for them to make money. By buying these patents, PAEs
compensate inventors, one of patent law’s objectives.”).
36. Michael Risch, Patent Portfolios as Securities, 63 DUKE L.J. 89, 98 (2013). See also
Schwartz, supra note 29, at 61–63 (discussing the role of patent aggregators in returning profits to
individual inventors).
37. Cotropia, supra note 5.
38. Risch, supra note 36, at 95–96.
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patents as property rights regardless of the status of the owner, “provide an
incentive to invest risk capital for commercialization[,] . . . considered to be
‘usually the most expensive part of the long haul from the mental conception
of the invention to the delivery of something useful into the hands of the
consumer.’”39 Taking that notion a step further, some commentators have
argued that the business of PAEs, separate from individual inventors, is already
spawning innovation through small and large companies alike by way of
promoting invention through licensing dollars.40 The sum of these ideas is that
individual inventors are being encouraged to invent through economic return
from patent licensing allowed by PAEs.
B.

The Two Sides of the Empirical Debate
1.

One Side of the Empirical Debate: PAEs are a Problem for the Patent
System

Many recent empirical studies have reviewed PAE impact broadly.
Perhaps most controversial is the James Bessen and Michael Meurer study
entitled The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes.41 That study found PAEs cost
society $29 billion annually.42 A comprehensive discussion of this study has

39. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 697, 743 (2001) (citing Giles S. Rich, Patents Are Bait 11 (1945) (unpublished
manuscript on file with Scott Kieff)). Rich was the co-author of the 1952 Patent Act. See also
Eriq Gardner, The Best Intentions, IP LAW & BUS., March 2006 (“Venture capitalists won’t even
fund new businesses without an assurance they can keep competitors out of the marketplace.”).
40. Bryan P. Lord, Evolution of the Technology Firm: IP Rights and the Business of
Licensing, in FROM ASSETS TO PROFITS: COMPETING FOR IP VALUE AND RETURN 19, 33–36
(Bruce Berman ed., 2009) (discussing the growth of technology through an IP licensing model).
See also James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the
Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190, 209–11 (2006)
(“Patent trolls actually benefit society. These trolls act as a market intermediary in the patent
market. Patent trolls provide liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to the patent
markets . . . .”). Indeed, often times practicing entities also choose to monetize patents they do not
practice, behavior very similar to entities in a licensing-only business.
41. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 22, at 388–89 (2014) (“The costs disclosed by this [study]
are significant and should play a prominent role in policy debates about the treatment of NPE
patent lawsuits.”). See also David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of NonPracticing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 455 (2014) (“With respect to
the debate about NPEs, we believe that focusing on costs and transfers from NPEs are somewhat
beside the point. The bigger picture, and the better question, is whether the lawsuits are being
brought because the defendants are infringers of a valid patent or whether the defendants are
merely easy targets for a nuisance lawsuit.”).
42. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 22, at 389. A previous study found that PAEs have cost a
total of $500 billion over the past twenty years. See Bessen et al., supra note 14.
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continued—with published response43—and does not need to be replicated
here; however, of key interest to this Article is the finding that:
[A]bout 70% of the payments that defendants make go to the legal costs of
both parties or to operating costs of the [PAEs]. . . . [M]ost of the money that
defendants pay does not represent a transfer to inventors; instead, it is largely
44
consumed by legal and operating costs.

Regarding a distinguishing of certain valuable PAEs in the study, Bessen and
Meurer conclude that certain PAEs that “administer patent pools” or “facilitate
technology transfer [or] outsourcing of R&D” are likely desirable, but
“standard economic-welfare analysis implies that patent litigation even over
valid patents can be socially harmful.”45
Other studies directly addressing the targets of PAEs have concluded that
PAEs disproportionately focus lawsuits on startups and small companies.
Colleen Chien’s 2014 study Startups and Patent Trolls found that “small
companies are vulnerable targets” for three fundamental reasons: they are
more likely to pay nuisance settlements regardless of the merits of a lawsuit;
they are regular users of technology; and they increase the returns to PAEs
through lawsuit settlement-validation of PAE patents, regardless of their
validity.46 In a 2013 New America Foundation study, Chien further concluded
that PAEs have a large impact on startup companies and that, according to
survey respondents, any “benefits do not appear to offset the harms.”47
Finally, in a 2011 study by John Allison et al. descriptively titled Patent
Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, the authors reviewed
patent litigation results of the 343 most-litigated patents.48 The results of the
study included that “the most-litigated patents that go to judgment are far more
likely to be held invalid or not infringed[;] . . . [o]nce-litigated patents win in
court almost 50% of the time, while the most-litigated—and putatively most

43. Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 41, at 428.
44. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 22, at 417. These conclusions have been questioned
through further analysis of the research data set. Among other things, the Bessen and Meurer
licensing revenue data was from only ten publicly traded companies. See Schwartz & Kesan,
supra note 41, at 433.
45. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 22, at 420–21.
46. Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 485–86
(2014), available at https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-lawreview/online/startupsandpatenttrolls.pdf.
47. Colleen V. Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, NEW AM. FOUND. 1, 4 (Sep.
2013), http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/PatentAssertionandStartupIn
novation_updated.pdf.
48. John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99
GEO. L.J. 677, 683 (2011).
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valuable—patents win in court only 10.7% of the time.”49 Allison et al. offer
preliminary thoughts regarding explanations for the results:
 “[D]efendants rather than plaintiffs are driving the decision to take a weak
patent to judgment by simply refusing to settle.”50
 “[T]he enforcement of a patent against multiple infringers is an indication of
51
widespread simultaneous invention and, hence, of obviousness.”
 “[T]he economics of patent litigation make it profitable to enforce . . .
52
patents that are overwhelmingly likely to lose in court.”

The authors admit that “[n]one of these explanations [are] entirely
satisfactory,” but they conclude that “as a society, we are spending a
disproportionate amount of time and money dealing with a class of weak
patents.”53
2.

The Other Side of the Empirical Debate: PAEs Can Be Good for the
Patent System

In addition to theoretical pieces regarding PAEs, Michael Risch has further
conducted empirical studies of PAEs in comparison to other types of patent
litigants. In a 2012 study regarding the top ten most litigious PAEs entitled
Patent Troll Myths, Risch concludes that a PAE bringing a lawsuit was very

49. Id. at 680 (“[C]ases involving the most-litigated patents are indeed more likely to settle
than ordinary-litigated patents with a high degree of significance. But to our great surprise, we
find that the willingness of these patentees to litigate their cases to judgment is a mistake. . . .
[T]he most-litigated patents that go to judgment are far more likely to be held invalid or not
infringed.”).
50. Id. at 681 (“We first investigate whether the outcome data are the result of clustering—a
few cases in multidistrict litigation that invalidate or hold not infringed multiple patents at once.
We find some evidence of clustering but not enough to explain the full differences in the
outcomes. One possible explanation is that defendants rather than plaintiffs are driving the
decision to take a weak patent to judgment by simply refusing to settle.”).
51. Id. at 679, 681 (“If you are a patent owner who faces multiple infringers, the deck is
stacked against you. . . . One possible option is to sue all the defendants at once. Doing so makes
the resulting case more complex, but it insulates the patentee from the risk of having to litigate
validity again and again.”).
52. Id. (“Alternatively, patentees that are involved (or expect to be involved) in multiple
lawsuits might reasonably be more likely to settle cases rather than risk taking them to judgment
because an adverse judgment wipes out all the other lawsuits as well.”).
53. Allison et al., supra note 48, at 681. The authors go on to state:
Nonpracticing entities and software patentees almost never win their cases. That may be a
good thing, if you believe that most software patents are bad or that NPEs are bad for
society. But it certainly means that the patent system is wasting more of its time than
expected dealing with weak patents. And it also suggests that both our measures of patent
value and our theories of litigation behavior need some serious reconsideration.
Id. at 712.
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likely to be the same entity that filed the patent application initially.54 Risch
further opines that individuals face a “significant disadvantage in high-stakes
patent litigation unless they allow [PAEs] to enforce their patents.”55 In his
study, Risch determined the following six common assertions regarding PAEs
were “myths”:
 Litigious PAEs are a recent phenomenon.
 PAE patents are business method patents.

56

 PAE patents and infringement claims are low quality.
 PAE patents come from nonproductive endeavors.
57

 PAEs obtain their patents from fire sales.

58

 PAEs wait for the industry to develop to file suit.

Risch states that “believers in individual inventing will favor [PAEs] because
they provide a remedy to such inventors.”59
Other authors have come to conclusions comparable to Risch’s when
conducting similar empirical studies regarding patenting and litigation
behavior of non-practicing PAEs.60 Those conclusions include the following:
PAEs “own patents that are of significantly higher value or importance than
other litigated patents”; PAE patents “rank higher than the litigated patents that
share the same technological class in every value measure employed”; and “the

54. Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 458, 470–72, 498–99
(2012) (“[The research reviews] [t]he top ten NPE . . . involved in 971 unique litigations. These
litigations involved 347 patents. In turn, the 347 patents resulted from 208 initial patent
applications, many of which spawned multiple patents.”).
55. Id. at 494, 498 (“A . . . justification of NPEs is that they provide better opportunities for
individual inventors to enforce their patents. There are two reasons NPEs might do so. First, they
may provide cost, money, and other resources to continue litigation in cases when contingent-fee
lawyers may not provide such resources. Second, they may provide better credibility for
settlement purposes. Each of these reasons explains why NPEs might serve the needs of
individuals in ways unnecessary for small companies.”).
56. Business method patents generally relate to a method of doing business regarding
automated businesses and e-commerce.
57. A fire sale is a sale of goods at extremely discounted below-market prices.
58. Risch, supra note 54, at 497–99. Risch goes on to conclude that PAEs may be the best
option for smaller inventors: “Individuals may face a significant disadvantage in high-stakes
patent litigation unless they allow NPEs to enforce their patents. This means that NPE litigation
may be the best way for garage inventors to capitalize on their patents if infringers refuse to
license.” Id. at 498.
59. Id. at 499 (“[O]ne’s beliefs about individual inventors should inform one’s beliefs about
NPEs. Strong believers in individual inventing will favor NPEs because they provide a remedy to
such inventors. On the other hand, those who believe individual inventors contribute little to
innovation and growth will not favor NPEs.”).
60. Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing
Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 117–18 (2010).
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success rate of [PAEs] in patent infringement litigation is quite similar to that
of other litigants.”61
Beyond current empirical research, some authors have studied historical
cases regarding inventors and patent litigants. In his 1995 article discussing the
history of medical-procedure patenting, Dr. William Noonan reviewed the
history of Charles Goodyear, the 1839 inventor of vulcanized rubber, who filed
multiple lawsuits against individual end-user dentists in furtherance of
monetizing his invention through licensing.62 In similar fashion—discussed by
Adam Mossoff in a recent article regarding the sewing machine wars of the
1850s—Elias Howe, the inventor of the lockstitch, made royalty demands
through suing patent-infringing retailers and manufacturers, even threatening
liability for all purchasers of unlicensed sewing machines.63 Finally, in her
2005 book, The Democratization of Invention: Patents and Copyrights in
American Economic Development, 1790–1920, the economist Zorina Khan
explains that “[e]xtensive markets in patent rights allowed inventors to extract
returns from their activities through licensing and assigning or selling their
rights.”64 In short, these researchers have concluded that a patent licensing
business model is not a new phenomenon and that licensing has provided a
profound incentive to initial innovation.65

61. Id. at 118.
62. William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 651, 652 (1995).
63. Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing
Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 184–85 (2011). Howe’s newspaper ad read:
“You that want sewing machines, be cautious how you purchase them of others than [Howe] or
those licensed under [Howe], else the law will compel you to pay twice over.” Id. at 185 (quoting
RUTH BRANDON, A CAPITALIST ROMANCE 90 (1977)). See also Christopher Beauchamp,
Professor of Brooklyn Law School, Panel Discussion at the George Mason University School of
Law Teleforum Panel: End-User Lawsuits in Patent Litigation: A Bug or a Feature of Patent Law
(Aug. 29, 2013) (recording available at http://cpip.gmu.edu/events/teleforum-panel-end-userlawsuits-in-patent-litigation-a-bug-or-a-feature-of-patent-law/). During the discussion, legal
historian Professor Christopher Beauchamp discussed his research regarding over a thousand
patent infringement lawsuits filed in the Southern District of New York alone in 1883 against
farmers for infringing a single patent on well drilling technology. See id. These end-user lawsuits
were brought by a company that Professor Beauchamp recognizes as falling within the definition
today of a PAE—a firm engaged solely in patent licensing. See id.
64. B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS
IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920, at 10 (2005).
65. Patent litigation causing national upset might not be a new phenomenon either. The
Goodyear Vulcanite litigations were terminated in 1879 when Goodyear’s patent infringement
manager, and company treasurer, was shot dead in San Francisco “by a particularly irate dentist
who objected to the use of the Vulcanite patents to interfere with his dental practice.” Noonan,
supra note 62, at 653.
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C. Proposed Changes in Patent Law Regarding PAEs
In 2013, multiple members of Congress proposed sweeping amendments to
current patent laws in an effort to combat perceived problems with PAEs.
Proposals included Senator John Cornyn’s Patent Abuse Reduction Act,
Senator Orrin Hatch’s Patent Litigation Integrity Act, Representatives Peter
DeFazio and Jason Chaffetz’s SHIELD Act, and Representative Robert
Goodlatte’s Innovation Act.66 After a single hearing, on December 5, 2013, the
U.S. House of Representatives passed the Innovation Act in what was
described as an effort to combat “abusive practices that have damaged [the]
patent system.”67 The “abusive practices” referenced are—in the words of the
bill’s author, Rep. Goodlatte—“patent trolls . . . fil[ing] numerous patent
infringement lawsuits against American businesses with the hopes of securing
a quick payday.”68 The Innovation Act would make a number of changes to
current patent law, including increasing allowances for defendants to stay
cases, increasing disclosure requirements for all patent owners and investors
with financial interests in the litigation, and forcing patent infringement case
management rules on district court judges regarding pleadings, discovery
timing, and cost-shifting.69
In response to Rep. Goodlatte’s bill, Sen. Patrick Leahy, chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, introduced a companion bill in the U.S. Senate
entitled the Patent Transparency and Improvements Act.70 Although Sen.
Leahy’s bill is regarded as a “less ambitious” version of the House’s
Innovation Act, it comparably includes many of the same litigation procedural
changes as the Innovation Act.71 The White House has already expressed
future approval for the passage of the House patent reform bill, with President
Obama even voicing support during his 2014 State of the Union address—

66. Current Legislative Proposals for Patent Reform, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/current-legislative-proposals-patent-reform (last updated Dec. 9,
2013).
67. Bartz, supra note 12 (quoting Congressman Robert Goodlatte); Andrew Williams, House
Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on Innovation Act, PATENT DOCS (Oct. 29, 2013),
http://www.patentdocs.org/2013/10/house-judiciary-committee-holds-hearing-on-innovationact.html.
68. Bartz, supra note 12.
69. Jessica M. Karmasek, Obama Pushes for Patent Reform Bill During State of the Union,
LEGAL NEWSLINE (Jan. 29, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://legalnewsline.com/news/federal-govern
ment/246846-obama-pushes-for-patent-reform-bill-during-state-of-the-union.
70. Tom Risen, Bipartisan Innovation Act Clears House, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec.
6, 2013, 11:46 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/06/bipartisan-innovation-actclears-house.
71. Karmasek, supra note 69.
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“[L]et’s pass a patent reform bill that allows our businesses to stay focused on
innovation, not costly, needless litigation.”72
As with the “troll” and empirical discussions regarding PAEs, opinions on
the proposed patent reform bills have been split. Some commentators have
argued that the Innovation Act’s changes will protect America’s businesses
from unnecessary “predatory patent troll” litigation, while others have accused
Congress of wanting to “create an unfair patent system where our taxpayerfunded courts protect major corporations . . . but leave individual inventors,
universities and start-ups out in the cold.”73 Perhaps the most notable opponent
to the current legislative proposals is David Kappos, former director of the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. In his testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee at the single hearing before the Innovation Act was passed, he
stated: “[W]e are not tinkering with just any system here; we are reworking the
greatest innovation engine the world has ever known . . . . If there were ever a
case where caution is called for, this is it.”74
D. Summary of Currently Popular PAE Perceptions: Patent Trolls vs.
Horatio Alger Inventors
The preceding analysis of recent PAE literature seems to split into two
very divergent themes. On one hand, the bulk of literature supports the
proverbial “patent troll” image for PAEs with bad actors and numerous
negative effects on the economy and consumers. On the other hand, a minority
of literature supports the idea of Cotropia’s described “individual inventor
motif”—bringing profit to the garage inventor wanting nothing more than to
monetize his “Flash of Genius” through a properly functioning patent system.75
To shorten the descriptor classes for the purposes of further discussion, the
PAE-problem literature points will be categorized as supporting proverbial
“Patent Trolls.” Alternatively, the PAE-positive literature points will be
categorized as supporting proverbial “Horatio Alger Inventors.”76 The resulting
analysis points, in comparison to the case studies, will then better determine if
PAEs are in actuality more “Patent Trolls” or “Horatio Alger Inventors.”

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. H.R. 3309 Innovation Act: Improving the Patent System to Promote American
Innovation and Competitiveness: Hearing on H.R. 3309 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. 2 (2013) (statement of David J. Kappos, Partner, Cravath, Swain & Moore).
75. Cotropia, supra note 5.
76. See supra Introduction and note 5 (explaining the historical descriptive term “Horatio
Alger Inventors”).
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Characteristics supporting an image of PAEs as Patent Trolls:
1. PAEs do not innovate; they seek to acquire broad patent claims that
encompass existing technologies.
2. PAEs work to create a patent thicket—overlapping intellectual property
rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually
commercialize new technology.
3. PAEs delay patent issuance, asserting patents or licensing negotiations in
furtherance of the infringing use value to the infringer increasing during
delay.
4. PAEs are more willing to prolong and broaden patent litigation.
5. PAEs do not transfer earned profits to inventors.
6. PAEs prey on startups and small companies.

Characteristics supporting an image of PAEs as Horatio Alger Inventors:
1. PAEs transfer resources from consumer-commercializing activities to
innovation.
2. PAEs stand for individual inventors who are not in the business of
practicing inventions.
3. PAEs spawn innovation through creation of a licensing marketplace for
inventions.
4. PAEs bringing a lawsuit are likely to be the same entity that filed the
patent application initially.
5. Individuals face a significant disadvantage in high stakes patent litigation
unless they allow PAEs to enforce their patents.

With these descriptor classes in hand, we can then compare the currently
popular PAE theories gathered against case study data.
II. CASE STUDIES AS A TYPE OF EMPIRICAL DATA
A.

Usefulness and Limitations of Case Studies

Case studies are an important part of empirical research used to illustrate
or disprove theories proposed in other analyses.77 They are an “empirical
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its

77. “Case studies . . . are important genres of empirical research that not only can yield
important insights but have the additional virtue that legal scholars with limited resources can
undertake them.” Peter H. Schuck, Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39
J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 323–24 (1989). “Case studies are a social scientific research method of
particular value to lawyers and public health advocates.” Julie Graves Krishnaswami, Nicholas
Freudenberg: A Selected Bibliography to Accompany A Conversation on Health and Law, 12
N.Y. CITY L. REV. 55, 57 (2008). See, e.g., KHAN, supra note 64, at 23; Mossoff, supra note 63,
at 203.
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real-life context.”78 Further, as a preliminary step in research, case studies are
an initial building block scholars can undertake and use to tailor greater
research plans.79 As discussed supra, while historical case studies of PAEs
have been conducted,80 and much current empirical research has been
undertaken,81 thus far no research has investigated detailed facts regarding the
inventors PAEs represent and the invention stories behind patents asserted by
PAEs.
The case study analysis here is neither generalizable nor intended to
represent a sampling for scientific generalizations.82 Instead, the purpose is to
test the previously developed PAE theories on a new research focus to develop
hypotheses that may then be tested systematically with a larger number of
cases.83 “If two or more cases are shown to support the same theory,
replication may be claimed. The empirical results may be considered yet more
potent if two or more cases support the same theory but do not support an
equally plausible, rival theory.”84
To begin the case study research for this Article, the author contacted
numerous legal academics, practitioners, and the largest PAE holding
companies. The author, and a fellow academic colleague, also posted an
anonymous request for PAEs willing to share information on the popular
patent law websites, Patently-O85 and IPWatchdog.86 The focus of the search

78. ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 18 (4th ed. 2009).
79. Schuck, supra note 77, at 324. See also David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not:
Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005,
1056 n.183 (1989) (“Although the case method represents a less than scientific way to test
hypotheses, it often provides stimulus for hypothesis development and thus scientific
advancement.”).
80. See, e.g., KHAN, supra note 64; Mossoff, supra note 63; Adam Mossoff, Who Cares
What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in
Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007); Beauchamp, supra note 63.
81. See supra Part I.B.
82. YIN, supra note 78, at 15 (“[C]ase studies . . . provide little basis for scientific
generalization. . . . [The investigator’s] goal will be to expand and generalize theories (analytic
generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).”).
83. “The detailed examination of a single example of a class of phenomena, a case study
cannot provide reliable information about the broader class, but it may be useful in the
preliminary stages of an investigation since it provides hypotheses which may be tested
systematically with a larger number of cases.” NICHOLAS ABERCROMBIE ET AL., THE PENGUIN
DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 34 (1984).
84. YIN, supra note 78, at 38–39.
85. Dennis Crouch, What Is Your Experience with Patent Assertion Entities and Patent
Licensing?, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/10/what-is-yourexperience-with-patent-assertion-entities-and-patent-licensing.html (posting anonymous request
for information).
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was to interview PAEs that were willing to share a patent conception and entity
creation story from start to finish. The initial requests for information,
however, were left generic regarding the use of the information. The emphasis
was to find PAEs that had original source materials to verify the validity of
information, thus ensuring independent verification of entity and invention
history.87
Surprisingly, despite the seemingly infinite amount of information
available discussing PAEs, there was very little factual detail regarding PAEs
obtainable. While countless practitioners, patent entity representatives, and
large PAE holding companies were willing to share information in confidence,
there were a variety of reasons presented that limited the sharing of
information or review of original source materials concerning invention or the
entity. Reasons included:
 The PAEs contacted were mostly all involved in active litigation that
presented too great a risk to have original, and potentially privileged,
documents shared with a third party or to have inventors speaking openly
on-the-record regarding the history of their invention or company.
 The patent licenses between the PAEs and licensees prohibit disclosure of
the patent detail, license detail, or dealings with any licensees.
 Licenses between inventors and PAE holding companies require that
inventors not disclose any information regarding the history of their
invention or patent.
 Any litigation regarding patents asserted by PAEs is not in the public record
due to sealed orders or agreements between the parties to not disclose
documents exchanged or details regarding the litigation.

Further, PAEs that successfully assert their patents and obtain licenses without
litigation are almost impossible to locate due to the lack of any public record of
the assertion or license.
Thankfully, through both the anonymous website requests and contact
leads through academic colleagues, four PAEs that were initially willing to
share information were identified. From these four, it was decided that two
entities would be ideal for the case study.88

86. Gene Quinn, Call for Information: Study on Patent Assertion Entities, IPWATCHDOG
(Oct. 9, 2013, 10:08 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/10/09/call-for-information-studyon-patent-assertion-entities/id=45658 (posting anonymous request for information).
87. Given the emphasis to find PAEs with original source material, it is recognized this
could skew selection of PAEs—those willing to provide materials, potentially of a certain type.
Since the purpose was case study research, as opposed to generalizable empirical research, the
potential selection bias is acceptable.
88. Due to the limited space allowed in this Article, it was determined that only two case
study entities should be used. The two entities preliminarily investigated for case study but not
used were Civix-DDI, LLC and OIP Technologies, Inc. These entities were not used for the
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The Two Case Study PAEs

The first case study entity, MercExchange, was selected for a variety of
reasons. First, the case and parties are quite well known in all legal circles after
the appeal from the Federal Circuit to the Supreme Court and the resulting
Supreme Court opinion. Second, MercExchange is often referred to as the
quintessential PAE or “troll” due to, among other things, its request for an
injunction to restrict eBay’s online business.89 Third, the inventor of the
MercExchange patent, Tom Woolston, and the lead counsel for
MercExchange, Greg Stillman, partner at Hunton & Williams LLP, were both
willing to share information and documents regarding the patent and case, and
they were also both willing to communicate on the record. Fourth, the patent
infringement dispute between eBay and MercExchange went through full
litigation proceedings, including lengthy discovery, trial, and appeal. Much of
the record created through the proceedings, including over 5000 pages of trial
transcripts and thousands of exhibit pages, were all publicly available. These
original documents, with much detailed direct and cross-examination
testimony, serve as an excellent base for understanding Woolston’s invention
and the true history of MercExchange. While certain details are based on
interviews with Woolston, as the citations indicate, a vast majority of detail is
strictly based on review of the original documents.
In contrast to MercExchange, the second case study entity, Capital
Security Systems (CSS), was selected for its relatively unknown prominence.
First, while existing for almost as long as MercExchange (over fifteen years),
and having filed infringement actions against many large companies (including
Diebold, Inc., JPMorgan Chase Bank, and Wells Fargo Bank), CSS has had
very little media coverage and its infringement litigations have ended relatively
quickly. Second, and similar to MercExchange, CSS would fit the mold of a
PAE as it has been understood in the current literature. CSS is a company that
does not sell any products and is partnered for licensing with IPNav, a
company described by The New York Times as “[having] a batch of patents,

following reasons: due to active litigation, some factual resources related to the entity could not
be provided; due to active litigation, entity counsel advised that on-record communication directly
with inventors should not be allowed; and only a limited number of publicly available documents
concerning the entities and inventions could be located. It should be noted, however, that from
preliminary research regarding these entities, the general factual story of these inventors,
inventions, and entities was no different than the two case study entities utilized.
89. Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange
L.L.C., supra note 24, at 1005–09; Lemley & Melamed, supra note 28, at 2141–42. See also
Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (“In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C. decision, district courts rarely grant injunctions in patent infringement
cases to patent-assertion entities (PAEs, also known as ‘patent trolls’).”).
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demanding a license fee from what it contends is an infringer, usually a titan in
the tech realm.”90 IPNav describes its approach to doing business as follows:
Because the patent system is based on patent holders being willing to go to
court to enforce their rights, many patent monetization firms are litigation
driven. At IPNav we’re not afraid to litigate, and we work with first-rate patent
litigators, but we’ve found that alternatives to litigation often produce better
91
and faster results.

Third, CSS owner and primary inventor, Robin Gustin, was willing to share
information and documents regarding CSS and its patents and was also willing
to communicate openly regarding the invention and entity history. Obtaining
primary historical documents regarding CSS was most important for the CSS
case study since there was no lengthy litigation or media record.92
III. CASE STUDIES OF INSTRUCTIVE PAES
A.

MercExchange, L.L.C. and Inventor Thomas G. Woolston
1.

The History of Thomas G. Woolston

The sole inventor of the MercExchange-owned patents is Thomas G.
Woolston.93 Mr. Woolston was born in Michigan and raised in Ohio.94 After
completing high school, he enlisted in the United States Air Force and was
trained for a year in electronics, computers, and radar systems, and a second
year in modern computers, telecommunications systems, and cryptography.95
After serving for a few years on a crew stationed in Japan doing peacetime
aerial reconnaissance, Mr. Woolston was assigned to the National Security
Agency in Maryland and began taking classes in computer science at the
University of Maryland.96
Upon honorable discharge from the Air Force, Mr. Woolston began work
with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), assigned to build and maintain

90. David Segal, Has Patent. Will Sue, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013, at BU1.
91. Our Core Beliefs, IPNAV, http://www.ipnav.com/about-us/our-philosophy (last visited
Oct. 9, 2014).
92. For these reasons the two case study PAEs fit the majority mold of ideal “trolls”
discussed in the previous Parts and are accordingly labeled as “instructive.”
93. U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (filed Nov. 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 6,085,176 (filed Mar. 8,
1999).
94. Transcript of Record at 304, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695
(E.D. Va. 2003) (No. 2:01-CV-736); Julia Wilkinson, The eBay Patent Wars: Interview with
MercExchange CEO Thomas Woolston, ECOMMERCEBYTES (Sept. 30, 2004), http://www.ecom
mercebytes.com/cab/abn/y04/m09/i30/s01.
95. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 305.
96. Id. at 306.
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CIA global communications networks.97 While at the CIA, Mr. Woolston
worked primarily as an engineer, planning and finding uses for CIA computer
networks.98 Mr. Woolston also continued his studies at The George
Washington University, focusing in electrical and computer engineering and
completing a degree in electrical engineering in 1991.99
Before leaving the CIA, Mr. Woolston continued his studies and began
attending The George Washington University School of Law at night.100 He
worked at the CIA for a total of six years before beginning work as a law clerk
and attorney at several private law firms.101
2.

The History of the Primary MercExchange Patents

The MercExchange-owned patents Mr. Woolston invented relate to ecommerce and the internet. Mr. Woolston had knowledge of technology in
these areas since the 1980s when he spent time working with supercomputers
at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.102 In 1993, when Mr.
Woolston learned that the United States government was going to privatize the
internet for business use, he started thinking about commercial uses that a large
internet network would allow.103 His breakthrough idea occurred in the
summer of 1994, when he heard a radio news report regarding the Major
League Baseball players’ strike.104 The radio report discussed a baseball-card
store in McLean, Virginia (close to Woolston at the time) that was going out of
business due to loss of customers and anti-baseball resentment in Northern
Virginia caused by the strike.105
In 1994, Mr. Woolston saw three primary options for a small business
collectible baseball-card store to advertise and sell cards to a customer far
outside their geographical area.106 The first option was advertising bulletin
boards and electronic versions of bulletin boards.107 These boards and similar
newspaper classified postings posed a variety of problems, including the fact
that the advertisement continues to be viewed after the good is sold, and
despite there being an advertisement for the good, the seller is under no

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 307.
Id.
Id. at 307–08.
Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 308.
Id. at 308–09.
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id. at 310, 448;Wilkinson, supra note 94.
Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 310.
Id.
Id.
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obligation to sell—the advertisement is just an invitation to continue
negotiations.108
The second existing option Mr. Woolston saw for a coast-to-coast
collectible sale was a catalog or electronic version of a catalog.109 Like bulletin
boards or classified ads, Mr. Woolston saw catalog sales as problematic in that
the seller could run out of stock for an item prior to a customer seeing the item
in the catalog and wanting to purchase.110 In Woolston’s mind, the limited
inventory and delay in communication was a fundamental problem for a smallinventory collectible sale.111
Finally, the third option for a coast-to-coast collectible sale was a
television show like the Home Shopping Channel—where a viewer watches a
show, sees an item that is currently available being advertised and sold, and
viewers across the country are given the opportunity to call and purchase the
item.112 Mr. Woolston was impressed by the immediate nature of the Home
Shopping Channel advertisement and sale but hoped to innovate on it.113
Woolston thought there would be value in an expanded version of the Home
Shopping Channel, where a viewer could contact the Channel, describe an item
for sale, and then the Channel would advertise the item across the country until
another viewer called in to purchase and the item was sold.114 Woolston
envisioned that the opportunity created by private uses of the internet would
allow for an invention that innovated on a live-Home Shopping Channel type
sales environment for collectible items.115
Accordingly, in the summer of 1994, Mr. Woolston used his background in
computers, computer networks, and a voice-over-network application he built
for the CIA, to create a solution that used the newly available internet in an ecommerce collectible sales invention.116 Woolston knew about communication
interfaces to allow computers to communicate with other computers in a
network and also knew about databases, credit card processing, and credit card
encryption necessary for an internet sales system.117 He put all that unique
personal knowledge together and for eight months worked to create “a

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 310–11.
Id. at 312.
Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 312.
Id.
Id. at 312–13.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 312–13.
Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 312–14.
Id.
Id. at 314.
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technical document that could actually perform the concept” for which he filed
a patent on in April 1995.118
While testifying under oath at trial in MercExchange v. eBay, Mr.
Woolston described how his invention would likely be “very helpful to small
businesses and individual sellers.”119 He described how the invention would
provide great value to the “small-town collector get[ting] to the bigger markets
and get[ting] a fair price for his item and sell[ing] them when he wanted to.”120
Woolston further testified that he wanted to build a business from the
invention, for profit, and how getting a patent “was what you were supposed to
do[,] . . . [what] you needed to do to build a business.”121 He understood the
process to be: “file for a patent application, . . . organize a company around the
idea, . . . then try to get people interested in investing or joining . . . , and then
build[ ] a company.”122
In discussing his motivation to invent almost two decades later, Mr.
Woolston states that his motivation came from the patent system’s function to
give inventors the right to exclude. “Patents give inventors the tangible right to
do it alone.”123 He went on to say that “in 1994, no one thought anyone would
ever buy an antique or collectible sight unseen on the Internet.”124 Without
patent protection, Woolston assumes, “why [would an inventor] educate the
marketplace and work on an independent idea if someone else could copy the
idea?”125 Accordingly, Woolston’s business plan for his invention anticipated
that “once he got the patent, investors would want to move forward.”126
3.

The History of MercExchange

The first step in Mr. Woolston’s plans to create profit and implement his
invention was to form a company.127 This was particularly important because
the invention’s fundamental system would “cost a lot of money . . . . to
build.”128 While working full time at his day job, Woolston founded his first

118. Wilkinson, supra note 94. See also Brief for Respondent at 1, eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130); Transcript of Record, supra note 94,
at 316, 649. Spring 1995 was also when Mr. Woolston graduated from law school. See id. at 308.
119. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 314.
120. Id. at 315.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Telephone Interview with Thomas G. Woolston, Founder, MercExchange (Oct. 15,
2013).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 490–91.
128. Id. at 487–88. In some correspondences, Mr. Woolston details development and
operating costs for the Fleanet business plan at over $100,000.00 per month. Id. at 516–19.
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company, Fleanet, in 1995.129 Its purpose was to “attract capital, attract people
and talent necessary to build e-commerce [and an] e-commerce company . . . in
Virginia.”130
Once Fleanet was formed, Mr. Woolston began reaching out to friends and
close acquaintances for business investment.131 Mr. Woolston drafted business
plans describing his invention, including what he saw as the best way to
implement the system, and began corresponding with whoever would listen
and be interested in partnering with him or investing in Fleanet.132 In January
1996, Mr. Woolston was in communication with many individuals and
companies, including MCI WorldCom and a series of venture capitalists, travel
agencies, web developers, antique dealers, art dealers, and George Mason
University.133 While the initial patent application was still pending, but after
gaining some business partners and investors, the Fleanet name was dropped,
and Woolston’s company became “MercExchange.”134 Between 1996 and
1998, raising capital continued to be difficult for Mr. Woolston and
MercExchange, with conversations with one venture capital firm resulting in
“screaming [at Woolston] . . . that no one will ever buy an antique or
collectible over the internet.”135
MercExchange’s breakthrough for investment finally came in December
1998 when its first patent issued and the Wall Street Journal published a
January 1999 article on MercExchange regarding its patent interference
proceeding pending against PriceLine.com.136 Mr. Woolston said “[i]t was like
magic within six weeks [of patent issuance], we had our first licensee; and
within six months, I’d been lured out of the legal profession into the dot-com
world.”137 The first licensee of the MercExchange technology was Aden
Enterprises, an internet incubator company based out of Omaha, Nebraska.138
Mr. Woolston began full-time work with Aden in October of 1999 to begin
development of auction software for a subsidiary of Aden known as LeftBid.139
Unfortunately for Mr. Woolston, Aden was not a focused enterprise, was
129. Id. at 490, 495.
130. Id. at 491.
131. Id. at 494–96.
132. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 497–500.
133. Id. at 503–04, 532–36. See also Joint Appendix at 311, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 236430.
134. Wilkinson, supra note 94.
135. Id. See also Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 535–38 (discussing numerous other
companies Woolston and MercExchange attempted to raise capital from and difficulties in
communicating with investors).
136. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 542–44, 546–47; Wilkinson, supra note 94.
137. Wilkinson, supra note 94. See also Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 548.
138. Joint Appendix, supra note 133; Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 548; Wilkinson,
supra note 94.
139. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 567, 571.
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attempting to build an online auction system that was different from his
invention,140 and became too entangled with other companies and
subsidiaries.141 Woolston eventually left the Aden companies in early 2000 and
began communications with other potential partners including I-Fly, Christie’s,
and Tiger Direct.142
4.

MercExchange’s Communications with eBay

In the spring of 2000, Mr. Woolston also began communications with
eBay—a multi-million dollar online auction business—in an attempt to build a
MercExchange system that would, in part, gather information from online
auctions held on ebay.com.143 eBay was not facilitating transactions on its
website at that time, so there were fundamental differences between eBay’s
processes and what MercExchange was hoping to build with Woolston’s
invention.144 Through the communications with eBay, in the summer of 2000,
eBay became interested in purchasing MercExchange’s patents.145 The timing
could not have been better for Woolston “because [his] company was falling
apart.”146 To further the conversation, MercExchange gave eBay’s attorneys a
confidential presentation regarding all its pending patents and their current
status in the Patent Office.147 The presentation seemed to go well, and, as
Woolston recalled, the eBay attorneys communicated, “Wow, we’re really
interested. . . . This is it; we can put the top back on the Genie[’]s bottle.”148
Soon thereafter, however, eBay requested that MercExchange provide the full
prosecution histories of the MercExchange patents.149 The requests continued,
and through the negotiations requesting that MercExchange send all patent
files to eBay’s attorneys’ offices in California, Mr. Woolston began to get “the
distinct . . . impression that eBay was trying to get a jump on [a] lawsuit,
because [they] weren’t dealing in good faith.”150

140. Id. at 344–45.
141. Id. at 344, 577–78; Wilkinson, supra note 94.
142. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 579–81, 592.
143. Id. at 581–82, 590. The MercExchange system being developed in early 2000 would be
effectively outlawed when eBay’s new tort of computer trespass was established in eBay, Inc. v.
Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). E-mail from Thomas G. Woolston,
Founder, MercExchange, to author (Jan. 9, 2014, 11:02 PM) (on file with author).
144. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 352, 597. Specifically, eBay did not offer “buy it
now” features on its website and sent all eBay transactions to separate partner-company websites
to facilitate payments. Accordingly, prior to 2000, eBay could not have infringed
MercExchange’s patents. See id.
145. Id. at 584. See also Brief for Respondent, supra note 118, at 3.
146. Wilkinson, supra note 94.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 593–94.
150. Id. at 595.
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After a few months of negotiations with eBay, it became MercExchange’s
position that eBay was “looking for ways to kill the patents instead of buying
them.”151 The negotiations ended, and, according to Mr. Woolston, within
three months “eBay was infringing every patent we had.”152 MercExchange
made the decision to file suit against eBay for patent infringement in mid2001.153 The case was filed on September 26, 2001 in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia.154
5.

The Current Status of MercExchange

The MercExchange v. eBay patent infringement lawsuit resulted in a fiveweek trial and a May 27, 2003 jury verdict for MercExchange with a $29.5
million judgment entered on August 7, 2003.155 The parties then continued
disputes up to the United States Supreme Court in 2006 regarding the issue of
whether an injunction should issue against eBay.156 The parties returned to the
district court in late 2006 regarding further proceedings related to an injunction
and patent reexaminations.157
MercExchange’s request for an injunction was again denied on July 27,
2007, and the parties returned to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
December 2007 after eBay was required to post a bond of $31 million.158 The
dispute between MercExchange and eBay finally settled in 2008.159 The
settlement resulted in the sale and full assignment, from MercExchange to
eBay, of all MercExchange patents and patent applications related to online

151. Wilkinson, supra note 94.
152. Id.
153. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 597.
154. Docket, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003) (No.
2:01-CV-736).
155. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 698–99, 722. The trial judge described the eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C. trial as being “one of the more, if not the most, contentious cases that
[his] court [had] ever presided over.” Id. at 714.
156. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). It has been suggested that the
denial of injunction related to the general comparison of MercExchange’s focused patent to the
multifaceted eBay.com website. Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement
Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 175, 218–19 (2011) (“eBay itself already embraces this notion of
comparing the relative values of patented inventions and accused products . . . . which compels
courts to compare the relative values of an underlying patent and a broader, infringing technology
when determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief.”).
157. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 608, 609–10 (E.D. Va. 2006).
158. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 556, 591 (E.D. Va. 2007);
Telephone Interview with Thomas G. Woolston, supra note 123. See also MercExchange, L.L.C.
v. eBay, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 2d 653 (E.D. Va. 2007).
159. Telephone Interview with Thomas G. Woolston, supra note 123.
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auctions.160 Neither MercExchange nor Mr. Woolston have been involved in
any further patent infringement lawsuits since settling with eBay.161
The MercExchange company still exists and currently holds two patents
related to “using internet router hardware as massively parallel sort engines for
topographically organizing web content like an auction instance.”162 The
current MercExchange patents are available for purchase or license but there
are no current marketing or development efforts for those inventions.163
6.

The Current Status of Thomas G. Woolston

Mr. Woolston is currently the listed inventor of twenty-four patents, with
his most recent patent related to an “Electronic Gaming Device with
Feedback.”164 He is on the Advisory Board of the Krasnow Institute for
Advanced Study,165 the Intellectual Property Advisory Committee to the
Virginia Joint Commission on Technology and Science,166 and also has an
active consulting practice specializing in raising capital for university research
and technology startup companies.
B.

Capital Security Systems, Inc. and Robin H. Gustin
1.

The History of Robin H. Gustin

The primary inventor of the Capital Security Systems patents is Robin
Haley Gustin.167 Ms. Gustin was born and raised in the suburbs of Chicago,
Illinois.168 She attended the University of Illinois at Chicago and graduated in
1986 with a BS degree in Business Sciences.169 After completing her degree,
she worked in the insurance and financial planning industry at a family
business, the Gustin Financial Services firm, until 1990.170
Following her interest in manufacturing and her talents in sales, in 1990,
Ms. Gustin accepted an account representative position with iVEX Protective
160. E-mail from Thomas G. Woolston, supra note 143.
161. Telephone Interview with Thomas G. Woolston, supra note 123.
162. Email from Thomas Woolston, supra note 143.
163. Id.
164. Id. See also U.S. Patent No. 8,485,903 (filed Dec. 10, 2010).
165. Thomas G. Woolston, KRASNOW INST. FOR ADVANCED STUDY, http://krasnow.gmu.edu/
trustees/thomas-g-woolston/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
166. Intellectual Property Advisory Committee Membership, COMMONWEALTH OF VA. DIV.
OF LEGAL SERVS., http://dls.virginia.gov/commission/jcots_IntProp2013.htm (last visited Oct. 9,
2014).
167. U.S. Patent No. 5,897,625 (filed May 30, 1997).
168. Telephone Interview with Robin H. Gustin, Founder, Capital Security Systems, Inc.
(Oct. 17, 2013).
169. ARTHUR GINGRANDE, MARKET RESEARCH REPORT ON THE SUPER ATM PLATFORM 50
(2001) (Capital Security Systems, Inc. Marketing Publication) (on file with author).
170. Id.
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Packaging Inc., a Hillside, Illinois based industrial packaging manufacturer.171
Ms. Gustin worked at iVEX for three years, distinguishing herself as the top
sales person in the Midwest Region.172 In 1993, she was recruited to work for
Bemis Company, Inc., a Minneapolis, Minnesota business specializing in
industrial plastics packaging.173 While at Bemis, Ms. Gustin traveled
throughout the Midwest helping manufacturers of all types improve their
production packaging efficiency.174 Her position at Bemis was as much
technical as it was client relations; through this experience, Ms. Gustin greatly
expanded her knowledge of automating systems and human-computer
processes.175
2.

The History of the Primary Capital Security Systems Patents and
Capital Security Systems

In 1993, while visiting a friend in Arizona who owned a number of check
cashing stores, Ms. Gustin began thinking of ways to help her friend resolve an
issue of employee theft.176 The theft problem related to multiple employeeonly processes involved in check cashing and a lack of electronic systems to
review and confirm the high cash-on-hand check cashing process.177 When Ms.
Gustin returned to Illinois from the trip, she used her “background in
manufacturing and automating systems” to create a method for electronically
“emulate[ing] the primary functions of [the] check cashing” process.178 Ms.
Gustin’s solution to the check cashing store problem centered around
automating the cashing of checks through a machine process that included
“machine recognition of printed and handwritten amounts on checks.”179 For
the next two years, Ms. Gustin spent countless hours—many at the Harold
Washington Library in downtown Chicago—researching automation
technology, bank networks, automated teller machine (ATM) systems, and
electronic payments within check cashing processes.180 A key portion of her
research focused on components to automate a new type of ATM machine,
originally called “The Money Exchange Machine.”181 Ms. Gustin also worked

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. GINGRANDE, supra note 169.
175. Telephone Interview with Robin H. Gustin, supra note 168.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Business Report, Capital Securities Systems, Inc., Timeline of Events Regarding CSS
Patents 1 (Oct. 29, 2013) (on file with author).
180. Telephone Interview with Robin H. Gustin, supra note 168; GINGRANDE, supra note
169.
181. Business Report, supra note 179.
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to find recognition software “that could intelligently scan hand printed and
cursive field data in order to process the checks in an ATM environment.”182
After two years of painstaking research and analysis, in late 1995, Ms.
Gustin formalized her discovery of unfulfilled needs in the electronic funds
transfer (EFT) market, particularly in the areas of ATM banking for
recognizing handwritten check fields for electronic check processing.183
Sensing a business need in the EFT market, and the government-sponsored
electronic benefits transfer market, Ms. Gustin left her position at Bemis to
start her own company called Capital Security Systems, Inc. (CSS).184 Her
intent with CSS was to work as an inventor, complete designs and prototype
building of an electronic check depositing machine, and partner with other
companies for manufacturing.185 Ms. Gustin personally raised approximately
$1 million in seed capital to fund CSS and began work on the “ATM
PowerBuilder” and “Super ATM” platform.186
From 1995 to 1997, Ms. Gustin worked full time at CSS to perfect the
designs, systems, and prototype for the CSS Super ATM.187 She hired
Livingston Products, Inc. to build a prototype ATM machine, and she hired
Arthur Gingrande, a leading expert in text recognition technology, to consult
for CSS regarding sourcing of software components into the prototype.188 In
1996, Mr. Gingrande referred Ms. Gustin to Mitek Systems in San Diego,
California, a company specializing in “technology that facilitates courtesy
amount recognition (CAR) and legal amount recognition (LAR) on checks.”189
After contracting with Mitek to begin work for CSS, Ms. Gustin relocated to
San Diego to help with the process of “incorporat[ing] their CAR/LAR
software engines into an ATM environment.”190
In May of 1997, after completing an early version of the Super ATM
prototype, Ms. Gustin and CSS filed for three patents related to enhancements
on the electronic cashing and ATM systems being developed.191 The patents
related to: “Check fraud detection (signature verification)”; “Wiring funds
from one account to another in an ATM environment”; and “Downloading

182. Id.
183. GINGRANDE, supra note 169; Business Report, supra note 179.
184. GINGRANDE, supra note 169.
185. Telephone Interview with Robin H. Gustin, supra note 168.
186. GINGRANDE, supra note 169; Three More Patents Approved for ATM PowerBuilder,
BUS. WIRE (July 13, 1999), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Three+More+Patents+Approved+for
+ATM+PowerBuilder.-a055135162.
187. Business Report, supra note 179.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. U.S. Patent No. 5,897,625 (filed May 30, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 5,987,439 (filed May
30, 1997); U.S. Patent No. 6,012,048 (filed May 30, 1997).
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dollars and cents left over from a transaction on an ATM network to a smart
card.”192 When making the decision for CSS to file for patent protection, Ms.
Gustin communicated with other inventors who owned patents and discussed
the issues with her design partners who helped build the CSS Super ATM.193
She “knew patents would be the only protection for the idea[s] [she] spent
many years…develop[ing].”194 To her, patents were the “sole protection to
further invention”—before she spoke with other companies about her ideas,
she needed to protect them with patent filings.195
After filing for patent protection in May 1997, Ms. Gustin went on a multiyear “road show” to banks and other large financial institutions in the hopes of
finding commercial partners.196 She contacted banks directly, created
marketing materials and videos of her Super ATM prototype in operation,197
and attended various banking industry events.198 Ms. Gustin’s log of activity
from 1997 to 2001 included hundreds of meetings, including prototype Super
ATM demonstrations to Diebold, Inc., Siemens-AutoTell, and IBM.199
Throughout the process of communicating with large commercial partners, Ms.
Gustin encountered much opposition to the potential success of her design.200
At one point, in 1998, a high-level manager from IBM remarked that
“electronic transfers of cash will replace checks, making the Super ATM
platform obsolete.”201
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, seeing an opportunity to help
increase the tracking of funds to prevent further terrorist attacks, in 2002, Ms.
Gustin hired a Washington, D.C. law firm to assist with introducing the Super
ATM platform to government agencies.202 Related to these efforts and the
national security need to track funds, in October 2003, Congress passed
legislation known as the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (Check 21
Act) that allowed the recipient of an original paper check to create a digital
version of the original check and eliminate the need for further handling of the

192. Business Report, supra note 179, at 2.
193. Telephone Interview with Robin H. Gustin, supra note 168.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Robin Gustin, SuperATM, YOUTUBE (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=xREmHNYKD6A; Robin Gustin, Super ATM, YOUTUBE (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=GH-WPQAbqBI.
198. Telephone Interview with Robin H. Gustin, supra note 168. See also Three More Patents
Approved for ATM PowerBuilder, supra note 186.
199. Business Report, supra note 179.
200. Id. at 2.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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physical document.203 The law was scheduled to take effect in October 2004,
and Ms. Gustin hoped that the Check 21 Act would serve as a “catalyst [to]
spur the banking industry to license the Super ATM patented platform.”204
Unfortunately for Ms. Gustin, the timing was still not right.
3.

Capital Security System’s Communications with Commercial Partners

Given the already widespread use of electronic check scanning ATM
machines, Ms. Gustin continued to reach out to large ATM manufacturing
companies, including Diebold and NCR,205 this time looking for commercial
partners or licensors of her patent portfolio.206 Coming up short with the larger
companies again, Ms. Gustin began to contact smaller financial institutions. It
was during these communications in 2005 that the business development
manager of a smaller financial services company said, “[W]hy should [we]
take a license or buy the Super ATM platform when everyone is
infringing?”207 In response to communications along these lines, Ms. Gustin
began to accept the conclusion that legal action to prosecute infringers would
have to be her final option.208
4.

The Current Status of Capital Security Systems

In 2006, seeing little option for business partners and widespread
infringement of her patent portfolio, Ms. Gustin began communications with
various attorneys regarding the prospect of patent infringement lawsuits to
203. Jeffrey Barry, Comment, The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (“Check 21”), in
Developments in Banking Law: 2004, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 1, 130–31 (2005)
(“Check 21 is a ‘financial modernization act’ that was passed after the September 11 terrorist
attacks. The attacks, and the subsequent interruption of commercial air travel, stimulated the
adoption of the new law. Check 21 was signed into law by President Bush on October 28, 2003,
and took effect on October 28, 2004. The purpose of the legislation is threefold: (1) to authorize
substitute checks, (2) to encourage innovation in the check cashing system, and (3) to make the
Nation’s payment systems more efficient. Check 21 is expected to lower check processing costs
and reduce the vulnerability of the check cashing system to disruptions in air and ground
transportation.”).
204. Business Report, supra note 179, at 3; E-mail from Robin H. Gustin, Founder, Capital
Security Systems, Inc., to author (Oct. 29, 2013, 7:19 PM) (on file with author) (providing
presentation slides used in the CSS meeting with the U.S. Department of Justice on June 27,
2005). The provisions of the Check 21 Act would further the electronic scanning and processing
of traditional paper checks. These processes are very closely related to the processes covered in
the CSS patents.
205. Diebold, Inc. and NCR, Corp. are two of the world’s largest ATM manufacturers.
Diebold is the largest United States maker of ATM machines. See Scott Hamilton, Carlyle to Buy
De La Rue Unit for 360 Million Pounds, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2008, 11:49 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ah0ErBvRdJd0&refer=uk.
206. Business Report, supra note 179, at 3.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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enforce CSS’s patent portfolio.209 Ms. Gustin initially had issues with finding
law firms that would represent her against large banking clients; however,
between 2006 and 2008, she began the organization of materials necessary to
prepare for a large patent infringement lawsuit.210 At this time, CSS also filed
multiple international patents and continued its U.S. patent prosecution
activities.211
Among other legal actions,212 in 2010, CSS sent a letter to Diebold
asserting that Diebold infringed at least two of the CSS-owned patents.213 In
January 2011, Diebold filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio seeking declaratory relief under the Declaratory
Judgment Act for harms associated with CSS’s 2010 letter.214 This became the
first substantive case of patent infringement for CSS, and litigation continued
until a September 2011 mediation report stated, “Settlement was reached,
subject to preparation and agreement on the settlement documents.”215 A
November 2011 order from the district court dismissed the case “pursuant to
. . . the parties’ confidential License and Settlement Agreement.”216
Moving on to the banks that utilize ATM machines, in September 2012,
after seeking expertise and funding partnership with IPNav,217 CSS filed suit
against JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Wells Fargo Bank
NA, Wells Fargo & Co., Compass Bank, and BBVA Compass Bancshare, Inc.

209. Id.
210. Id. at 3–4.
211. Business Report, supra note 179, at 4.
212. The first patent infringement case involving CSS was filed in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California on September 30, 2010. See Complaint for Patent
Infringement at 1, Capital Security Systems, Inc. v. CU Cooperative Systems, Inc., No. CV-1007322 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2010). CSS, as plaintiff, asserted patent infringement against CU
Cooperative Systems, Inc. See id. The action was soon dropped based on misunderstandings of
the defendant’s business practices. E-mail from Robin H. Gustin, Founder, Capital Security
Systems, Inc., to author (Jan. 16, 2014, 10:54 PM) (on file with author). A second case involving
CSS was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma on
November 2, 2010. See Complaint at 1, U.S. Payments, L.L.C. v. Capital Security Systems, Inc.,
No. 10-CV-701 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 2, 2010). The action, with CSS as defendant, was for
declaratory judgment that U.S. Payments, LLC did not “violate[ ] any U.S. patent rights held by
CSS.” Id. The complaint cited an October 2010 letter CSS sent U.S. Payments CEO. Id. at 4. A
notice of dismissal was filed six days after the complaint based on an understanding between the
parties regarding U.S. Payments’ operations not infringing any CSS patents. E-mail from Robin
H. Gustin, supra.
213. Complaint at 2, Diebold, Inc. v. Capital Security Systems, Inc., No. 5:11-CV-26 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 5, 2011).
214. Id. at 1.
215. Notice of ADR Administrator at 1, Diebold, Inc., No. 5:11-CV-26 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 20,
2011).
216. Order at 1, Diebold, Inc., No. 5:11-CV-26 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2011).
217. See supra Part II.B; E-mail from Robin H. Gustin, supra note 212.
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for patent infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas.218 Litigation continued for a little over one year until a November 19,
2013 filing stated that the plaintiff and defendants “hereby move for an order
dismissing all claims . . . subject to the terms of that certain agreement entitled
‘AGREEMENT’ and dated November 13, 2013, with each party to bear its
own costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees.”219 An Order of Dismissal With
Prejudice was entered by the court on November 21, 2013.220
As of January 2014, CSS currently has multiple licenses of its patent
portfolio but does not have any litigation pending.221 CSS is currently still
partnered with IPNav.222
5.

The Current Status of Robin H. Gustin

Ms. Gustin is now the listed inventor of six U.S. patents with over 780
forward citations, including some from leading ATM manufacturers and
financial institutions.223 After nineteen years of working full-time and “sinking
her life savings into CSS,” she now assists her patent monetization legal team
full-time with documentation and coordination of company materials.224
IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CASE STUDIES
A.

Fundamental Differences and Similarities Within the PAE Case Studies

Comparing the two PAE case studies reveals both fundamental differences
and similarities in the inventor and invention stories leading up to the patent
assertions. Regarding differences, first, Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin are from
geographically different parts of the United States: Mr. Woolston went to
school, worked, and started his company in northern Virginia; Ms. Gustin went
to school, worked, and started her company in metropolitan Chicago. Second,
both inventors have very different educational backgrounds: Mr. Woolston was
initially trained in the Air Force and then went on to study engineering and law

218. Complaint at 1, Capital Security Systems, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al., No.
2:12-CV-604 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2012).
219. Joint Stipulated Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice, JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 2:12CV-604 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2013).
220. Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 2:12-CV-604 (E.D. Tex.
Nov. 21, 2013).
221. E-mail from Robin H. Gustin, supra note 212 (confirming status of CSS).
222. Id.
223. Quick Search, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/
search-bool.html (select “Inventor Name” in Field 1 and search for “Robin Haley”) (last visited
Oct. 10, 2014). Forward citations are the number of citations received by a particular patent by
subsequent patents. They are often seen as a sign of patent value.
224. E-mail from Robin H. Gustin, supra note 212; Telephone Interview with Robin H.
Gustin, supra note 168.
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at university; Ms. Gustin studied business in university and then learned
manufacturing and automation processes while working at packaging
companies before independently studying the ATM check cashing industry.
Regarding further differences, third, Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin’s
inventions relate to completely different markets and products: Mr. Woolston’s
inventions relate to new commercial uses for the internet in commerce and the
sale of goods through internet commerce; Ms. Gustin’s inventions relate to
electronic financial processes and the capabilities of modern ATM machines.
Fourth, Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin followed different inventive steps: Mr.
Woolston had an invention idea in the summer of 1994, then spent months
working by himself to create a detailed technical document that could perform
the concept before filing for patent protection individually in 1995; Ms. Gustin
learned of the check cashing process shortfalls in 1993, then spent a few years
learning about the ATM and financial industry before founding a company,
raising capital, hiring engineers to build a prototype, and filing for patent
protection—with other inventors listed—in 1997.
Regarding similarities between the case studies, first, Mr. Woolston and
Ms. Gustin both operated on similar timelines: they both conceived of
inventions and filed for patent protection in the early/mid 1990s, they both
attempted to build companies and raise capital around the inventions for five to
ten years, and then they both made the decision to enforce their patent rights
through litigation. Second, both Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin began enforcing
their patent rights against companies they originally sought business
partnership relationships from long before the companies infringed the patents.
Regarding further similarities, third, Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin both
initially attempted to build and manage their own companies around their
inventions—even putting careers on hold and investing life savings into the
companies; neither inventor founded their company with a business model
associated with patent litigation. Fourth, Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin were
both met with great skepticism during the initial discussions with investors and
partners regarding the feasibility of their inventions.225 Fifth, both Mr.
Woolston and Ms. Gustin saw obtaining a patent for their invention as the only
protection possible to protect their business, the protection to give them the
ability to share their ideas and raise capital for their business, and the
fundamental motivation for them to invest in and develop revolutionary new
ideas. It is noteworthy that two inventors with no relationship to each other—
who have never met or spoken and who have completely different
backgrounds—both describe such similar motivations to invent: Mr. Woolston
noted that “[without a patent,] why [would an inventor] educate the
marketplace and work on an independent idea if someone else could copy the

225. See supra Parts III.A.3, III.B.3.
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idea?”; Ms. Gustin noted that “[patents are] the sole protection to further
invention.”226
B.

Comparison of Case Study Facts to the Currently Popular PAE Theories

As discussed in Part I, the recent PAE literature splits in two very different
directions regarding PAEs exemplifying pre-described “Patent Trolls” or
“Horatio Alger Inventors” characteristics. Accordingly, the following section
will analyze the case study facts to each characteristic identified in Part I. As
discussed in Part II, the following comparisons—based on two limited case
studies—cannot be used to draw general conclusions regarding a class of all
PAEs. The purpose instead is to test the currently popular PAE theories on a
new research focus to create an additional incremental data point. The research
focus may then be tested systematically with a larger number of cases.
1.

Characteristics of PAEs Refuting a Patent Troll Image

PAEs do not innovate; they seek to acquire broad patent claims that
encompass existing technologies.
The facts concerning both case studies refute this assertion. The ideas of
both Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin were very innovative at the time both
inventors began development—so innovative they were rejected by industry
leaders as impractical. Further, both inventors filed for initial patent protection
with the intent of building their own companies and commercializing their own
ideas. There is no material to support a notion that the MercExchange or CSS
patents were initially filed for any future patent litigation use.227
PAEs work to create a patent thicket—overlapping intellectual property rights
that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize
new technology.
The facts concerning both case studies refute this assertion. The initial
patent filings of both Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin were completed with the
strict intent of protecting their own ideas in furtherance of commercializing
their own inventions. The single patent that Mr. Woolston filed in April 1995
was focused around his own collectible sales business plan. The three patents
Ms. Gustin filed in May 1997 were for enhancements to the existing electronic
check cashing and ATM systems in the marketplace—all patents were

226. See supra Part III.
227. The only caveat to this conclusion is that after the initial MercExchange and CSS patents
were filed, at a point when litigation seemed more apparent, claim amendments and ongoing
patent prosecution could have been broadened as a future litigation strategy. Further research into
the prosecution history of all patents involved in litigation would have to be conducted to better
understand the timelines of those events and patent claim amendments.
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developed from an early version of the Super ATM prototype she had worked
on for years with multiple consultants.
PAEs delay patent issuance, asserting patents or licensing negotiations in
furtherance of the infringing use value to the infringer increasing during delay.
The facts concerning both case studies refute this assertion. For Mr.
Woolston and MercExchange, patent issuance was always seen as the solution
to delays with raising capital. Accordingly, expediting the patent review
process to more quickly fund and expand MercExchange was a primary goal.
Additionally, when MercExchange began communicating with eBay regarding
patent licenses, eBay was not infringing. Once eBay did begin to infringe the
MercExchange patents, MercExchange filed suit in less than a year—there was
no delay. In the same way, CSS filed for patent protection as quickly as
possible so Ms. Gustin could begin her “road show” to banks and other
financial institutions in the hopes of finding commercial partners. She also
repeatedly contacted companies, like Diebold, to engage in partnership
discussions and, years later, to discuss patent licensing. While Diebold’s filing
of a declaratory judgment action might support a notion that CSS was delaying
a lawsuit, the fact that Diebold had been contacted by Ms. Gustin almost a
decade before (regarding a partnership to manufacture her Super ATM)
negates any notion of delay on the part of CSS.
PAEs are more willing to prolong and broaden patent litigation.
The facts concerning both case studies refute this assertion. Regarding
MercExchange, the trial litigation tactics, procedural facts regarding appeals,
and the district court’s forcing of a bond to be posted after the Supreme Court
appeal (because there was still no resolution between the parties), most
certainly draws the inference that it was eBay prolonging the litigation,
settlements, and proceedings. Regarding CSS, the facts are unclear since there
has not been an infringement trial or other substantive litigation proceeding
involving the patents. In the short litigation that has ensued, it does appear that
quick settlement—or simply a quick end to litigation in cases of noninfringement—has occurred in every proceeding.
PAEs do not transfer earned profits to inventors.
The facts concerning both case studies refute this assertion. Perhaps most
clear from Mr. Woolston’s and Ms. Gustin’s stories is that the initial individual
inventor behind each of the patents asserted in litigation are still the owners of
the patents and the primary recipients of profits earned from the infringement
litigation. While one of the most prominent patent monetization firms did
partner with Ms. Gustin (IPNav), that partnership was only in furtherance of
Ms. Gustin being able to earn profits from her invention and not be unfairly
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disadvantaged in litigation against large companies with large litigation
budgets.
PAEs prey on startups and small companies.
The facts concerning both case studies refute this assertion. Regarding Mr.
Woolston and MercExchange, the case against eBay was filed in 2001. While
eBay was a startup internet success story in the mid-1990s, by 2001 eBay was
already a huge multi-million dollar company. Beyond the eBay lawsuit, there
is no evidence to suggest that MercExchange was ever planning to assert its
patents against any small startup companies.228 Regarding Ms. Gustin and
CSS, neither of the two patent infringement suits CSS filed were against small
companies. The September 2010 Central District of California case229 was filed
against Co-Op Financial Services (CU Cooperative Systems, Inc.), “the
nation’s largest credit union service organization,”230 and the September 2012
Eastern District of Texas case targeted some of the largest banks in the
country—JPMorgan Chase Bank, Wells Fargo Bank, and Compass Bank.231
In fact, when looking for a proverbial “David vs. Goliath” story regarding
patent infringement, both case studies show numerous examples of a small
startup patent owner—attempting to gain investors or build a product based on
intellectual property—being exploited by large already-existing companies that
did not respect patent rights. For MercExchange, eBay spent considerable time
learning of Mr. Woolston’s business and patent filing history before making
the decision to infringe Mr. Woolston’s patents.232 Similarly, for CSS, large
ATM companies, like Diebold, learned of her Super ATM product capabilities
years before introducing their own infringing ATM products. Accordingly,
from the case studies, the only evidence of large actors using size or resources
to their advantage is on the part of the large-company defendant patent
infringers.233
228. MercExchange was involved in one other patent litigation case, filed in 2000, against
GoTo.com. MercExchange v. GoTo.com, No. 2:00-CV-826 (E.D. Va. dismissed June 19, 2001).
The case settled favorably for MercExchange in 2001 for $4 million shortly after discovery
commenced. See eBay Patent Wars, ECOMMERCEBYTES.COM, http://www.ecommercebytes.com/
cab/pages/patent (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). GoTo.com was not a small startup company in 2000
when MercExchange filed suit. GoTo.com was eventually purchased by Yahoo!, Inc. in 2003 for
$1.63 billion. See Yahoo! Search Engine Analysis, SEO LOGIC, http://www.seologic.com/guide/
history/yahoo (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
229. This case was quickly dismissed after filing. See supra, note 212.
230. CO-OP FINANCIAL SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 3 (2014), available at https://co
-opfs.uberflip.com/i/335402.
231. Complaint, supra note 218.
232. See supra Part III.A.4.
233. Given this implication, one noteworthy aspect of PAEs might be that they promote social
justice balance within intellectual property law. See Steven D. Jamar & Lateef Mtima, The
Centrality of Social Justice for an Academic Intellectual Property Institute, 64 SMU L. REV.
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Characteristics of PAEs Supporting a Horatio Alger Inventor Image

PAEs transfer resources from consumer-commercializing activities to
innovation.
The facts concerning both case studies support this assertion. For all legal
actions reviewed where resources transferred due to judgment or licensing
settlement, the transfer was from an active consumer-commercializing entity to
the initial technology innovator. While the consumer-commercializing entity
might also be an innovation entity, the primary business was one of
commercialization and not innovation.234 Further, looking at the post-litigation
history of both Mr. Woolston and Ms. Gustin, both inventors have continued to
develop new technology. Both inventors have been issued additional patents,
and in the case of Mr. Woolston, he has expanded his subject areas of
innovation far beyond anything MercExchange was initially founded to
develop.
PAEs stand for individual inventors who are not in the business of practicing
inventions.
The facts concerning both case studies weigh in favor of this assertion but
the analysis is not perfectly clear. Both MercExchange and CSS were founded
to design and develop commercial products. Both companies were also
founded by inventors who had never owned or managed a company before.
While both companies did originally plan to do more than simply own patents,
as time went on, both entities eventually consisted of only the individual
inventor and the patents. It is also worth noting that both companies had great
difficulties with raising capital, communicating with larger existing business
partners, and—on the part of MercExchange—internal company management.

1127, 1130 (2011) (“The advent of digital technology and related advances provide a means by
which to utilize intellectual property regimes to bridge the societal goals of social justice and
equality with those of cultural progress and global competition and hegemony. Indeed, a principal
justification for protecting intellectual property is to encourage the creation and dissemination of
information and knowledge, and the ultimate efficacy of this civic agenda is dependent upon the
pervasiveness of its reach: every citizen should have effective access to both.”). See also Anupam
Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Is Nozick Kicking Rawls’s Ass? Intellectual Property and Social
Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 563, 578–79 (2007) (“No human domain should be immune from
the claims of social justice. Intellectual property, like property law, structures social relations and
has profound social effects. . . . Intellectual property law will help define the possibilities and
human capabilities of this Age.”).
234. By way of tangible example, eBay is an internet commerce company that owns multiple
patents but creates profit from consumer commercial activity, not innovation sales. In contrast,
while MercExchange was founded with different plans in mind, its primary output has been to
develop technology, file for patent protection covering the technology, and then disperse the
technological know-how to investors and commercial companies.
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Amongst other things, if the success of the patents within litigation can be
considered a sign of innovative value, then that would most certainly be the
greatest value added—certainly a greater value added than either entity
practicing the inventions. In short, while the original entity intent and evolution
does not make this a clear analysis, a conclusion that both Mr. Woolston and
Ms. Gustin are primarily best at innovation can certainly be drawn.
PAEs spawn innovation through creation of a licensing marketplace for
inventions.
The facts concerning both case studies weigh in favor of this assertion but
the analysis is not perfectly clear. Both MercExchange and CSS have licensed
their patents, and both entities have transferred resources from
commercialization of an invention to the original inventor; however, it is
unclear if there is any increased marketplace for licensing inventions or any
growth in innovation broadly through invention licensing. The CSS litigation
facts do draw the inference that once companies begin to license a patent,
similar companies would be more willing to license; but this is certainly not a
marketplace open to other invention licensing. There is no evidence of
innovation outside MercExchange/Mr. Woolston or CSS/Ms. Gustin occurring
as a result of the MercExchange and CSS litigation.
PAEs bringing a lawsuit are likely to be the same entity that filed the patent
application initially.
The facts concerning both case studies support this assertion. The case
studies make perfectly clear that the entities and individuals who originally
filed the patent applications—MercExchange/Mr. Woolston and CSS/Ms.
Gustin—are the entities and individuals bringing the patent assertion lawsuit.
Individuals face a significant disadvantage in high stakes patent litigation
unless they allow PAEs to enforce their patents.
The facts concerning both case studies support this assertion. Regarding
MercExchange, as the trial testimony of Mr. Woolston made clear, at the time
MercExchange thought eBay was genuinely working to purchase
MercExchange’s patents, “eBay was [in fact] trying to get a jump on [a]
lawsuit.”235 After a few months of patent sale negotiations with eBay, it
became MercExchange’s position that eBay was simply “looking for ways to
kill the patents instead of buying them.”236 In the same way, when CSS sent
letters asserting that certain companies were infringing their patents rights,
those companies, as plaintiffs, filed declaratory judgment actions of non-

235. Transcript of Record, supra note 94, at 595.
236. Wilkinson, supra note 94.
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infringement instead of waiting to see if CSS would file a lawsuit. Further, as
evidenced by the MercExchange v. eBay trial and appeals, all litigation options
possible—including appeals to the Unites States Supreme Court—will
potentially be waiting for anyone who attempts to assert patents. While legal
freedoms to negotiate under any motivation, file a lawsuit preemptively, or
appeal any judgment are certainly options, both case studies illustrate how
individual patent owners could not possibly assert and litigate their own
patents without an extensive legal team of support and a large amount of
financial resources to cover the litigation costs.
C. The Need for Further Empirical Research
While the case studies described here support the Horatio Alger Inventor
view of PAEs, this research is extremely limited. First, both case studies could
be outliers of PAE circumstances—a larger sampling of PAE case studies is
needed to draw formal final conclusions. Second, while the author has
attempted to understand the PAE literature and compare the two case study
facts to the most important PAE characteristics being discussed, there could be
additional analysis points that these—and other—PAE case studies can be
evaluated against. Third, additional analysis into any case study can always be
conducted—for example, as discussed in Part IV.B.1, research into the patent
prosecution history of the PAE patents may provide further insights into the
business or litigation strategy of PAEs.
CONCLUSION
The case studies discussed here repudiate the common view of PAEs as
patent trolls lurking beneath the bridge of innovation exacting tolls on the
patent system and overall economy. To the contrary, the case study research
here, while only a preliminary investigative step to provide a hypothesis,
supports the countervailing view of PAEs representing the interests of “Horatio
Alger Inventors” who tirelessly labor to build bridges of innovation and who
seek only their fair share. Specifically, these two case studies illustrate that:
1. Modern inventors see obtaining a patent covering their invention as the
fundamental motivation to invent and the only protection possible to
protect their business, share ideas, and raise capital.
2. PAEs enforce patent rights against companies they originally sought
business partnership relationships from long before the companies
infringed their patents.
3. PAEs represent the original inventors and patent applicants who
initially intended to build and manage their own companies based on
their inventions. Accordingly, PAEs transfer resources from consumercommercializing companies to original inventors.
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4. PAEs assert inventions which were revolutionary at the time of
conception but, for a variety of reasons, did not themselves become a
commercially successful business enterprise.
5. PAEs do not: seek to acquire patents that encompass existing
technology; work to create a patent thicket; seek to delay patent
issuance, asserting patents, licensing negotiations, or litigation.
6. PAEs represent small companies that were ignored by large companies
when business partnership and patent licensing offers were initially
communicated.
7. Individuals and small companies face a significant disadvantage in
patent assertion pursuits unless they have extensive legal support and
sufficient financial resources to cover litigation expenses.237
These insights are at odds with most current “troll” and empirical research
regarding PAEs. Accordingly, this Article counsels for further research and
analysis regarding the individuals PAEs represent and the patented inventions
asserted by PAEs. This broader research should be conducted before any
sweeping changes to the patent system are considered.

237. For a reminder of the limitations on the applicability of these points, see supra Part II.A
and note 82.

